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BEYOND THE ECONOMIC AGENDA: TOWARDS 
A NORMATIVE DIMENSION OF PARADIPLOMACY1 
Magdalena Kania*
ABSTRACT
The phenomenon of paradiplomacy, broadly referring to external activities of sub-state 
governments and embracing to a lesser or greater extent the elements defining foreign 
policy, gains an interest of experts from various academic disciplines. Yet, over the recent 
years, with some exceptions, the academic literature has been more preoccupied with 
investigation of economic dimensions of paradiplomacy when compared with investigation 
of normative-oriented issues. The objective of this article is to analyse the potential of the 
sub-national actors paradiplomatic activities in the field of development assistance. The 
articles adopts an exploratory research design and it based theoretically on the studies on 
paradiplomacy. It looks at the particular examples of sub-state governments from the EU 
countries. The results show that despite little attention concerning the problem, the local 
governments go through the process of an ongoing institutionalization of their activities in 
development assistance as they have launched their own development aid programmes, 
manage local budgets for development aid, and established administrative bodies in charge 
of conducting development aid programmes. Due to such institutionalization of development 
assistance policy, sub-state governments are capable of establishing and developing 
bilateral and multilateral relations with third parties, both state and non-state actors, 
confirming that they are politically and economically adequately resourced.
Key words: Paradiplomacy, Development assistance policy, Sub-state government,
Decentralized cooperation in development
Introduction
The phenomenon of paradiplomacy, broadly referring to external activities 
and policies of sub-state governments and embracing to a lesser or greater 
extent the elements defining foreign policy, emerged in recent years within
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entitled Development Aid o f Sub-state Actors in the European Union).
61
Politicke vedy/  Studies
certain academic disciplines. Paradiplomacy evokes traditional diplomacy 
practices carried out by the official representatives of central governments, 
especially in terms of directions (external activity) and motives (realization of 
economic, political, cultural interests). However, studies on sub-state 
governments’ international engagement remain biased. The economic motives 
behind paradiplomatic activities dominate the field of examination, and with 
some exceptions2, they serve as an explanation of paradiplomacy. 
Nevertheless, in recent years there is a tangible shift in approach to 
paradiplomacy, in a consequence of which the normative dimension becomes 
more relevant. It results in global support for a more participatory approach in 
certain public policy domains (i.e. development aid policy and human rights 
protection). As a consequence, it led to the incorporation of normative issues 
into the sub-state governments’ external agendas. The aim of this article is to 
examine the potential of sub-national actors from the EU countries as rising 
donors in global development aid policy. The argument behind the article is that 
in recent years, sub-state governments intensified their activity in normative- 
oriented external policies, by structuring and institutionalizing development 
assistance policy at the sub-state level, therefore they extended significantly the 
conventional dimensions of paradiplomacy. In this context, development aid 
policy reflects a normative dimension of external policies, since it derives from 
the normative stance, that highly advanced states have a moral responsibility to 
assist developing and underdeveloped countries. Although they have gathered 
limited attention, the local governments from the member states of the EU have 
developed bilateral relations with foreign actors, opened representation offices 
in developing countries and launched their own ad hoc and permanent 
development aid programmes. They manage local budgets for development 
assistance and have established administrative bodies with the responsibility to 
manage development policies. In light of scarce literature, the article aims to 
analyse the role of sub-state governments in the EU as emerging actors in 
global development assistance.
It must be acknowledged that despite the enthusiasm towards sub-state 
governments’ international activities expressed by researchers working on
2 These exception are related to the specific sub-categories of paradiplomacy, as for instance 
protodiplomacy, which is defined as “initiatives and activities of a non-central government abroad 
that graft a more or less separatist message on to its economic, social, and cultural links with 
foreign nations” (Duchacek, 1986, p. 240). However, as pointed out by Noe Cornago (Cornago, 
2010, p. 32), in practice paradiplomacy only sporadically turns into protodiplomacy.
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paradiplomacy, the bigger picture remains ambiguous at best. In fact, the 
international actorness of sub-state governments is rather limited in scope and 
is expected to maintain its secondary status, as pointed by Matthew Mingus 
(2006, p. 581) who notes that “states [sub-state governments -  MK] should be 
able to speak their minds but must ultimately keep in line with existing federal 
policies in the international arena”. Now, the question emerges of what are the 
reasons behind sub-state governments’ political willingness to provide their own 
political and economic resources to operate within the global system of 
development assistance. The article has been divided into the following parts. 
The first section locates the analysis within the concept of paradiplomacy, 
tracing the general motives behind the involvement of sub-state governments in 
international relations. The section highlights the economic, political and cultural 
motives behind paradiplomacy. In the second part, the paper moves towards an 
exploration of current trends of the sub-state governments’ presence as global 
donors in development aid system, while it harks back to the well-established 
question of the political actorness, the ability to perform as a full-fledged political 
actor3. The issue of politicization of a normative realm gains a new salience. To 
this end, the article reveals that in light of lack of the international recognition of 
sub-state governments as full-fledged stakeholders in international affairs, the 
economic ties are not sufficient to affirm their global position. This part has been 
limited to three cases: Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland.
1 The Essence of Paradiplomacy: Economic-Political- 
Cultural Triangle
The phenomenon of sub-state governments’ external activities labelled in 
academic literature as paradiplomacy remains a relatively marginal domain of 
interests for IR and Political Science experts. The micro-perspective of foreign 
policy extended to the concept of paradiplomacy gets as many opponents as 
proponents in a theoretical perspective. The first ambiguity of paradiplomacy is 
reflected in the signification of the term. In 1961, Rohan Butler in the article 
entitled “Paradiplomac/’ described the meaning of thereof as “the highest level
3 The question of who is capable to be an actor in international relations remains the center of 
attention of IR theories. For instance, the realist tradition is built upon a narrow definition of political 
actorness, indicating state-centric perspective according to which sovereign states are principal 
actors in world politics (Gilpin, 2001, p. 17). Contrary, the liberal tradition adopts a multi-centric 
perception of social reality, resulting in diffusion of equal decentralized actors (Rosenau, 1988).
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of personal and parallel diplomacy, complementing or competing with the 
regular foreign policy of the concerned minister” conducted by other-than-formal 
diplomatic officers (Butler, 1961, p.12). However, despite a fetching façade, 
Butler’s neologism has been “doomed from the beginning”, since he gave a new 
name to a phenomenon, which has been previously known in the literature as 
secret diplomacy (Kutznetsov, 2015, p. 26). Nevertheless, Butler’s 
understanding of paradiplomacy has been evoked in some further research (i.e. 
Hamilton, Langhore, 2011, p. 151-152, 182). Yet, due to the fact that Butler’s 
neologism has not indicated the specific level of political actorness, his definition 
is distinctive when compared with today’s interpretations of the term. The first 
studies on what is currently defined as paradiplomacy (external activities of sub­
state governments) were published in the 1970s, although researchers did not 
adopt the exact term of paradiplomacy. In many cases, the early studies 
suffered from the fact that due to the dominance of case-study methodology, 
their academic outputs revealed serious weakness and limitations (Kuznetsov, 
pp. 34-35). The newly emerged vitality of studies on paradiplomacy was 
introduced by Ivo Duchacek (Duchacek, 1984; Duchacek, 2001), who rooted 
the term in the academic discourse. However, despite more than three decades 
of research, the analytical definition of paradiplomacy remains vague and falls 
into academic trends in IR described by Inaki Aguirre as endowing “certain 
buzz-words with a mysterious success in specialized literature” (Aguirre, 2013, 
p. 185). Aforementioned tendency does not imply that paradiplomacy remains a 
purely theoretical and academic concept or an abstractive phenomenon. 
Contrary, it has been conceptualized due to the previous observations of 
political practice going beyond state-centric frames of analysis. The definition 
provided by Ivo Duchacek, who was rather sceptical of the concept of 
“paradiplomac/’ at the beginning4, depicted paradiplomacy as the “[activity of] 
constituent governments of larger national policies to assert an international 
competence of own, primarily in matters touching upon their respective 
jurisdiction” (Duchacek, 1984, p. 5). This interpretation consists of three crucial 
elements -  (1) constituent units of state as providers, (2) activity oriented 
beyond national borders and (3) realization of own local interests -  and as such 
prevailed in literature as a definition of paradiplomacy (see more: Keating, 2013;
4 In his article from 1984, Ivo Duchacek used the name of „paradiplomacy” only in the abstract, 
aiming to describe a broad concept consisting of trans-border regional regimes and global micro­
diplomacy.
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Aldecao, 2013; Cornago, 2013). Etymologically, paradiplomacy is an 
abbreviation of the “parallel diplomacy”, in a sense that it denotes diplomatic 
activities provided in parallel to traditional state diplomacy (Duran, 2015, p. 23). 
However, as “more functionally specific and targeted, often opportunistic and 
experimental” (Keatings, 2013, p. 11), paradiplomacy implies rather “a second- 
order set of activities, a pale imitation of real diplomacy” (Hocking, 2013, p. 21).
To structure the complex analysis of external policies of sub-state 
governments, it is necessary to make certain general remarks at this point. 
Regarding a broad scope of the meaning of paradiplomacy, the analysis shall 
be split into three analytical dimensions. First, the organizational dimension 
highlights political institutions and legal structure of sub-state governments as 
driving factors influencing their international performance. Second, the 
conceptual dimension embraces areas of academic expertise within the 
framework of which paradiplomacy has been examined. To this end, Alexander 
Kuznetsov (Kuznetsov, 2015) distinguished 11 dimensions of paradiplomacy -  
constitutional, federalist, nationalism, IR dimension, border studies, 
globalisation, security/geopolitical, global economy, environmental, diplomacy 
and separatism angles. Third, the motivational dimension embraces the motives 
behind sub-state governments’ international performance. Following part will 
focus strictly on the latter one. For that reason, three basic sets of “traditional” 
motivations for sub-state governments’ international participation were 
distinguished, as it has been indicated in academic literature: economic 
dimension, political and cultural dimension (Blatter et al., 2008; Keating 2013).
Sub-state governments have developed strictly economic-oriented external 
activities in parallel with their political agendas. It has been reflected in setting 
up of trade offices abroad (California5), broadening trade relations through 
regular business meetings and business trips encouraging export and foreign 
direct investments (Florida6, Quebec7), and in the establishment of promotional
5 As indicated by Robert Kaiser, California launched three offices responsible for trade and 
investment activities in Shanghai and in Argentina, becoming in a period of the 2000-2005 present 
in all o f its top-ten export market. It follows the logic that the sub-state governments are more prone 
to invest their resources abroad if their economies are more integrated into international markets 
(Kaiser, 2005, p. 98).
6 The State Governor of Florida, Rick Scott, undertook 13 abroad trade missions (incl. Brazil, Chile, 
Japan, France, Canada), including the most recent to Argentina, which took place in April 2017. 
However, his predecessor, Governor Jeb Bush took approximately 16 trade missions during his 
leadership (Fineout, 2017).
7 For instance, Investissement Quebec or Invest in Quebec.
65
Politické vedy/  Studies
agencies seeking new foreign investors8. Due to the tangible profits of 
economic-oriented activity, promotion of local economic development remains 
one of the most dominant motives influencing international relations carried out 
by sub-state governments as revealed in several case-study research (Casson, 
Dardanelli, 2012; Keating, 2013; Milani, Ribeiro, 2011; Nganje, 2014). The 
consequence of liberalization of the global economy, which rumbled on across 
the 1980s and beyond, was the opening of global markets to political actors 
other than states. Due to the neoliberal structural reforms at the domestic level, 
sub-state governments have begun playing an increasing role in economic 
processes. For that reason, the rise of sub-state governments’ international 
practice could be explained as a “pragmatic response (...) to the opportunities 
and challenges of rapid globalisation and economic interdependence” (Ngaje, 
2016, p. 150). However, the opening of the world economy to other than state 
actors is a double-edged sword. From one side, sub-state governments 
undertook their external activities to boost local export and to benefit from 
bilateral economic and trade cooperation. From the other side, the environment 
became more rivalry since more than ever actors have been involved (Haggard, 
Kaufman, 1992). However, the rational calculations, highlighting more gains 
from potential economic ties rather than the harm of potential political losses 
resulted in a situation in which sub-state governments became highly 
dependent on international trade (Paquin, Lachapelle, 2005). The rise of sub­
state actors as in international economy is reflected in numbers. There are 
nearly 200 sovereign nations, and close to 300 sub-state governments 
(federated states), not to mention the level of municipalities and cities as rising 
global actors (Mingus, 2006, p. 581). Moreover, while considering 25 leading 
nations in the world rank (GNP), only 10 could have been inserted as states in 
the early 1990s (Fry, 1993, p. 122-139).
The political ambition arising over sub-state activity on the international 
scene is reflected in various aspects. Through the extension of paradiplomactic 
activities, sub-state governments validate their contested international 
actorness. While in many cases sub-state governments achieved noticeable 
political successes, the functional effectiveness plays a role of specific 
justification and legitimization of their international activity. Therefore, the 
symbolical ability to present itself as a responsible actor, capable of conducting 
independent external activities, is a political success. Paradiplomacy serves
8 For instance, Catalonia - Consorcio de Promoción Comercial de Cataluña, COPCA
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therefore as a soft-power tool, aiming to “promote and improve the image of a 
country in minds of the foreign public” (Scoproni, 2016, p. 235-236). In that 
context, building a regional brand is not so far from the national branding. As a 
combination of clear and simple symbols, characteristic features and attributes, 
it provides an image easily understandable by the greater audience (Scoproni, 
2016, p. 237). Positive image built globally, accompanied by economic 
competitiveness attracts a various audience: tourists, business and industry, 
residents and highly skilled workers. On the flipside, the self-perception of sub­
state governments as global actors obliges them to a greater engagement in 
global political initiatives. One of the most tangible practices in that context is 
the engagement in global advocacy for human rights (Government of Flanders, 
2016; Scottish Human Right Commission, 2013). In fact, human rights are 
incorporated into the local strategies or adopted within special plans or 
frameworks devoted to the human rights-based approach to development 
assistance (i.e. Government of Brandenburg 2012; Government of Flanders 
2011; Scottish Government, 2016; Senate of Bremen, 2015).
The third dimension of the motivational sphere is the promotion of a distinct 
culture. As such, it rarely walks alone, and in political practice serves as a 
supplement for economic and political agenda. There is a shift in sub-states’ 
cultural paradiplomacy, which took place in recent years. Primarily emerged as 
an “a nationally determined, locally relayed, welfare-oriented” policy, it became 
a “supra-nationally facilitated, locally determined, wide-ranging supply-side 
intervention” (Jessop, 1997). It must be acknowledged, however, that in some 
cases cultural diplomacy plays a significant role in going abroad. This is the 
case of the city of Barcelona and the region of Catalonia. With the 
transformation of Barcelona towards a service economy in the 1980s, the city 
began to attract potential foreign actors through the channels of cultural 
paradiplomacy, which was implemented “in a context of social legitimacy, a 
strategy for economic and social development’ (Zamorano, Morato, 2015, p. 
568). In political practice, the cultural diplomacy carried out by the city of 
Barcelona supported its image as a stateless nation, since it was focused on a 
national identity, which served to boost Barcelona’s political activity and as an 
instrumentalization in the sense that it became an “instrument for the 
construction of a New State” (Zamorano, Morato, 2015, p. 569-570).
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2 Towards a normative agenda in external policies
Rapid changes in the international environment fostered by the processes of 
globalisation, which had altered the structure of the development aid system, 
led to greater inclusion of sub-state actors as global aid donors. In many cases, 
the multiplicity of actors within the state expressing international ambitions is at 
first glance considered as a challenge to the activity of central governments. 
However, bilateral relations between the central and sub-state governments 
cannot be regarded in zero-sum terms, in which the dominance of one part 
undermines the other part (Frankowski, 2014, p. 57). Contrary, international 
activity of sub-state governments can internationally strengthen the national 
identity of central governments and provides a fertile ground for the creation of 
“a multi-layered policy milieu which ties together governmental and non­
governmental actors in mutual dependencies” (Hocking, 2013, p. 20). Following 
the logic of decentralization in development cooperation, a good number of sub­
state governments from highly developed countries have challenged the role of 
states, represented by central governments, and international organizations as 
the exclusive players in development aid policy. In political reality, for sub-state 
newcomers, development aid policy served as a backdoor-entry to international 
politics. Debates over paradiplomacy paradoxically rarely pay heed to normative 
matters in sub-state governments’ international agenda. In academic literature, 
the “matters of functional relevance” reflected mainly in economic dimension 
dominate the field of sub-state governments’ international practice (Cornago 
2010). What is missing is the ongoing institutionalization of development 
assistance policy of sub-state governments.
The institutionalization of development assistance policy at the local level is 
structured upon certain pillars: (1) legal basis -  laws and agreements regulating 
sub-state governments’ international engagement; (2) actors -  administrative 
bodies at the local level in charge of conduction of development assistance 
policy; (3) resources -  distinguished budget lines for development assistance 
programmes; (4) strategies -  specific programmes of development assistance 
for specifically selected countries of priorities; (5) concepts -  the extension of 
the scope of development cooperation.
The decentralization of development assistance is based on the legal acts, 
which provide sub-state governments with specific competencies in that field. 
The Spanish law on development cooperation of 1998 (Ley 23/1998) 
established a framework for the local and regional governments to participate in
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decentralized cooperation in Spain. Consequently, the amount of assistance 
extended by them significantly increased (OECD, 2005, p. 17). Soon after, 
Catalonia along with other autonomous communities signed an agreement with 
the Spanish Governments in order to carry out its policy. The Catalan 
development assistance is put into practice under the terms expressed by 
Catalonia’s Development Cooperation Act 26/2001 of 31 December 2001 
(Presidencia de La Generalitat, 2001). The law lays down the general principles 
and objectives of Catalan development assistance, providing a basis for 
following Masters Plans, the main strategic plans of Catalan development 
assistance, which define the directions, available resources, as well as 
geographic and sectoral priorities. To entry into force, Master Plans have to be 
approved by the local Parliament. Moreover, the specific directorate in charge of 
development assistance policy is obliged to publish annual plans for 
development assistance. The current Master Plan for 2015-2018 (Generalitat de 
Catalunya 2015) is the fourth published, following the former of 2011-2014, 
2007-2010, and 2003-2007. Similarly, in the case of Belgian sub-state 
governments, the general competence to conduct independent development 
policy has been agreed at the national level, and then the competencies have 
been transferred to the regions. The Belgian Constitution provides Flanders and 
Wallonia with the competence to engage globally in issues related to their 
domestic jurisdiction. In the course of 2000-2001, during the fifth state reform in 
Belgium, the chambers of Parliament adopted the Lambermont Accord (The 
Parliament of Flanders, 2006) consisting of a considerable increase in federal 
transfers to communities. The aforementioned agreement derived from the 
pressure for greater decentralization, which began with several reforms in the 
1970s and beyond (Blochliger, Vammalle, 2012). Among other provisions, the 
accord transferred certain powers to the regions and communities in the field of 
development cooperation (Delwit, Hellings, 2001). The current recognition of 
decentralized cooperation in the Belgian legal framework is provided by the Law 
on Cooperation in Development of 2013, however, the Flemish Government 
adopted its own Decree on Development cooperation in 2007 (Government of 
Flanders, 2007), updated in 20018 (The Parliament of Flanders, 2018). In the 
case of Scotland, development assistance remains a reserved power under the 
terms of the Scotland Act (Scotland Act 1998). There is no statutory requirement 
for the Scottish Government to get involved, however, the local government may 
assist in international development activity as indicated in the Scotland Act. 
Therefore, the engagement of the Scottish government is fully voluntary.
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The second dimension of institutionalization of development assistance 
policy at the sub-state level is the establishment of administrative bodies as 
distinguished actors to manage and carry out development aid policy. In the 
case of Catalonia, there are two distinguished bodies. The Directorate-General 
within the framework of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is responsible for 
general policy-making, and the executive agency -  Catalan Agency for 
Development Cooperation (ACCD). The latter is responsible for the 
management of development assistance, operating as a main implementing 
body under the control of the government. The two-fold structure creates a 
typical agent-principal relation. In 2004-2005, during the reorganization of a 
government, the Flanders International Cooperation Agency (FICA) has been 
established as an “executive arm of Flemish administration for development 
cooperation”, yet after the financial crisis, it has been absorbed fully by the 
Flemish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (OECD, 2018). Currently, the government of 
Flanders provides its development assistance within the Department of Foreign 
Affairs; however, it is not responsible for implementation. In order to remain in 
compliance with international standards of the aid/development effectiveness, 
the Flemish government leaves the implementation to the other stakeholders, 
mainly located in the developing countries. Within the structures of the Scottish 
government, a minister of international development and Europe is appointed to 
support the Cabinet Secretary for Culture, Tourism and External Affairs in 
development assistance activity.
The third dimension of institutionalization is the management of budget lines 
for development assistance. Catalonia’s annual plan of cooperation for 
development in 2017 increased the budget line with €30.2 million, which 
compared with 2016 presents a 65.5% increase. The current Master Plan for 
2015-2018 (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015) expects a “sustained percentage 
increase” in development cooperation budget of the Catalan government, 
setting the objective of 0.4% percentage of current income by 2018, in a 
manner that an increase should occur each year. The Scottish Government 
allocated around £9 million for the annual budget for four countries of priority; 
however, spending on Malawi consumes nearly half of the overall budget. The 
main source of the Flemish government’s funding for development cooperation 
is the development cooperation budget. Expenditures under development 
cooperation policy embrace both cooperation development budget and the 
Flemish Climate Fund. In 2016, €24.95 million has been spent, which records 
the lowest spending rates since 2010. However, the overall ODA spending in
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Flemish case increased in 2016, due to an increase in the other ODA category, 
resources for activities and projects that “have a positive impact on developing 
countries” (Government of Flanders, 2017).
The fourth dimension of institutionalization relates to the specific 
programmes undertaken by sub-state governments that established bilateral 
relations with countries of recipients that have been awarded status of countries 
of priority. The Catalan Master Plan for 2015-2018 established 11 priority 
countries/societies, referring to the geographical concentration. Therefore, 
Catalonia provides its development assistance to Nicaragua, Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Bolivia, Colombia, Equator, Morocco, Western Sahara, Senegal, 
Mozambique, and Palestine. However, in order to limit the streams of 
engagement, the assistance is provided for particular sectors in particular 
countries, as for instance gender in Morrocco, and healthcare in Mozambique. 
Under the current International Framework, the Scottish Government is active in 
four countries of priority -  Malawi, Rwanda, Zambia, and Pakistan. However, in 
case of emergency, the government provides humanitarian assistance to other 
countries, as it used to be as a response to the crisis in Syria, the Philippines, 
Gaza, West Africa, and Yemen. The Flemish Government signed 
memorandums of understanding with South Africa, Malawi, and Mozambique to 
whom it provides development assistance based on Country Strategy Papers. 
The cooperation between the Flemish government and those countries traces 
back to support provided by the Flemish authorities to the post-Apartheid 
provinces of South Africa -  Limpopo, KwaZulu Natal and the Free State (OECD, 
2018, p. 96).
The last dimension reflects the extension in the scope of development 
cooperation between the sub-state governments and recipient countries. It 
embraces an increasing number of sectors, within which the assistance is 
distributed and funds are allocated. Yet, it must be noted that the increase is not 
recorded at the level of particular actors. Although being engaged in various 
aspects of assistance generally -  political, economic, and social aspects -  the 
number of sectors of engagement is limited to a few at the level of particular 
governments. For instance, Catalonia adopts a broad notion of development 
assistance, which shall not be limited to economic assistance, but which aims at 
providing local societies with certain political and social rights. While the overall 
idea behind the provision of development assistance is based on human rights 
approach, the Government of Catalonia operates within the health sector, 
education, economic sector, protection of human rights, and empowerment of
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the position of women, environmental issues, and peacebuilding activities. The 
Scottish Government invests and allocates its funds in areas such as education, 
health, sustainable economic development, civic governance and society, food 
security as well as energy and climate change. Flanders adjusts the sectors of 
cooperation to each country to whom the assistance is provided. The extension 
of sectors is tangible in the context of Flemish and South African cooperation. In 
2001, a year the Flemish Government and South Africa signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding the scope of assistance was relatively modest, limited nearly 
to fighting against poverty and promotion of democratization. The first Country 
Strategy Paper (CSP) for 2005-2008 indicated food security and agriculture, 
small enterprise development and HIV/AIDS prevention as the sectors of 
involvement. The following Country Strategy Paper 2012-2016 focused both on 
the economic dimension of assistance (job creation, small business 
development, agriculture, food security) and other cross-cutting themes (gender 
equality, children’s rights, HIV/AIDS prevention, sustainable development, good 
governance, climate change) (Government of Flanders, 2011).
Conclusion
Although the economic dimension of paradiplomacy dominates the field of 
studies on the external activity of sub-state governments, the increasing 
interdependence of the world politics leads to greater inclusiveness of a rising 
number of public policies in which sub-state governments are involved. 
Development assistance policy in decentralized modality, despite relatively low 
records, when compared with volumes of aid delivered by states, is in fact of a 
paramount significance for symbolic reasons. It is not surprising then, that when 
the unquestionable and politically uncontroversial domains are at stake, the 
incentives to get on board are widespread. Development assistance policy may 
boost the positive image of the sub-state government abroad. Due to the 
institutionalization of development assistance, sub-state governments are 
capable of establishing and developing bilateral and multilateral relations with 
third parties, both state and non-state actors, confirming that they are politically 
and economically adequately resourced. They, therefore, directly contribute to 
the global efforts aiming at facing the most pressuring societal challenges. For 
this reason, the capacity to intervene in the field of development assistance may 
put sub-state governments in one line with traditional donors, as states and 
international organizations. It presents “an ambition to take a more independent
72
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place in the world and a belief that in doing so better aid will result’ (Gibson, 
2016, p. 6). Political costs of engagement are incomparably lower when 
compared with political gains. Thus, sub-state governments are not gathering 
attention when it comes to the critique of the ineffectiveness of development 
assistance, as they remain hidden in the shadow of greater players, as state 
actors and international organizations. For sub-state governments, it is a win- 
win game.
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